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COMMENTS
RETAIL CREDIT SALES AND USURY
Consumer credit has expanded immensely in recent years' to
reach strata of the population previously excluded. As a result,
it has embraced thousands of consumers who are much less
sophisticated about debt than bankers and merchants, and has2
left a dramatic increase in personal bankruptcies in its wake.
Concurrently, there have been legislative and judicial efforts to
control consumer finance enterprises for the protection of consumers. Legislative control is represented by retail installment
sales acts,, applicable to all goods, 4 or to motor vehicle sales
only,5 which fix maximum finance charges and otherwise regulate consumer financing. Judicial control, represented by application of usury statutes to retail credit sales, is examined in
the first part of this Comment. The remainder of the Comment
surveys pertinent Louisiana law.
USURY AND SALES: THE COMMON LAW

The General Rule
If a consumer desires a new car but lacks sufficient cash to
pay the purchase price, he may acquire the car in either of two
ways. He may borrow the necessary cash to complete the purchase price, or he may purchase through a credit transaction.
In the latter alternative, he probably would enter a conditional
sale contract and give a promissory note for the unpaid balance
1. In 1945 outstanding consumer credit totaled over five billion dollars; in
1956 over forty-two billion dollars; in November 1963 over sixty-seven billion

dollars, of which over fifty billion dollars represented installment obligations.
The growth of consumer credit and its
FED. RESERVE BULL. 88 (Jan. 1964).
significance is thoroughly explored in another publication of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT pt. I
(1957).
2. About 90% of all bankruptcies are filed by persons working for wages
or salaries. See generally, Snedecor, Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy, 35 REF.
J. 37 (1961).
3. More than 30 states have enacted such laws. For studies of this legislation see Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 ConNELL L.Q. 38 (1958); Note, 58 CoLum. L. REV. 854 (1958).
4. For example, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 401-418.
5. For example, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-16-1 to 10 (1953). Louisiana
has such a statute. See LA. R.S. 6:951-976 (1950). This statute is discussed
in text accompanying note 132 infra.
[822]
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To the cash sale price, or to the unpaid bal-

ance after the vendee makes a cash down payment, the vendor
will add a finance charge, usually calculated from rate charts
furnished by a finance company, to obtain the credit sale price,

or the balance to be financed. The vendor then generally assigns
the contract and negotiates the note to a finance company at
such discount that he will receive the difference between the
cash down payment of the vendee and the cash sale price. As a
result vendor receives the sale price immediately and vendee becomes debtor of the finance company.7 Whether he borrows cash
or buys on credit, the consumer obtains the car and remains
with a debt. This debt will be larger than either the part of the
purchase price obtained by loan or the unpaid balance of the

price in the credit sale since it will be inflated by interest or
finance charges. Obviously the two types of transactions per-

form the same economic function with respect to the consumer
and his debt. In legal effect, however, there is an important
difference. The first transaction is characterized as a loan, and

the pertinent usury statute is applicable.8 The second is characterized as a sale to which usury statutes generally are held not
to apply.9

Common law doctrine begins with the premise that usury can
occur only in connection with either a loan or a forbearance of
debt. 10 A loan, in this context, is an agreement by which one
6. In Louisiana the transaction probably would be a credit sale in which the
vendee gives a promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage. This practice is
used since Louisiana refuses to admit that a conditional sale of a movable, as a
conditional sale is understood at common law, is possible. See Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908).
7. For a more detailed description of credit sale financing, see Adelson, The
Mechanics of the Instalment Credit Sale, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 218 (1935).
8. See United Tire & Inv. Co. v. Trone, 189 Okla. 120, 113 P.2d 977 (1941).
9. See VOLD, LAW OF SALES § 62 (1959) ; WHITNEY, LAW OF MODERN COMMERCIAL PRACTICE § 616 (1958). If the vendee gives a promissory note for the
unpaid balance, and the note is to bear an unlawful rate of interest after maturity, the local usury statute may be applicable. Since the debt is due on
maturity of the note, the interest charge is for forbearance of debt, which is
within the ambit of usury statutes. See note 10 supra.
10. See Struthers v. Drexel, 122 U.S. 487 (1887) ; Oil City Motor Co. v.
C.I.T. Corp., 76 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1935) ; Ballard v. First Nat'l Bank of
Birmingham, 261 Ala. 594, 75 So. 2d 484 (1954) ; Blaisdell v. Steinfeld, 15 Ariz.
155, 137 Pac. 555 (1914); Verbeck v. Clymer, 202 Cal. 557, 261 Pac. 1017
(1927) ; Philadelphia Real Estate Trust Co. v. Wilmington & N.C. Electric Ry.,
77 Atl. 756 (Del. 1910) ; Bell v. Idaho Finance Co., 73 Idaho 560, 255 P.2d 715
(1953); Clements v. Crane, 234 Ill. 215, 84 N.E. 884 (1908); Hamilton v.
Kentucky Title Savings Bank & Trust Co., 159 Ky. 680, 167 S.W. 898 (1914) ;
Hopkins v. Flower, 256 Mass. 367, 152 N.E. 635 (1926) ; Dunn v. Midland Loan
Finance Corp., 206 Minn. 550, 289 N.W. 411 (1939) ; Robb v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 351 Mo. 1037, 174 S.W.2d 832 (1943) ; London v. Toney, 263 N.Y.
439, 189 N.E. 485 (1934) ; Ector v. Osborne, 179 N.C. 667, 103 S.E. 388 (1920) ;
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party transfers a sum of money to another who agrees to repay
that sum absolutely.1 1, Ordinarily the borrower will agree to
repay an additional sum (interest) for the use of the money
12
borrowed. Only this last sum is limited by usury statutes.
Forbearance of debt is best illustrated by an extension of time
for payment of a matured obligation. 13 Usury statutes apply
only to the consideration given for this forbearance.1 4 Thus
usury statutes operate on two kinds of agreements, and in each
the statutes touch only the charge assessed and not the basic
agreement.
A credit sale is considered conceptually different from either
a loan or forbearance of debt, and therefore usury statutes are
not applied to it. 1 5 The vendor, it is said, may justly have one
price at which he will sell for cash and a higher price at which
he will sell on credit. 16 The increase in price represents the
Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945) ; Case v. Fish, 58 Wis.

56, 15 N.W. 808 (1883).
11. See In re Grand Union Co., 219 Fed. 353 (2d Cir. 1914); Milana v.
Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 355, 163 P.2d 869 (1945) ; Brem v. Cook, 147
Tex. 374, 216 S.W.2d 179 (1949).
12. Usury is commonly defined as contracting for or receiving something in
excess of the amount allowed by law for the loan of money or forbearance of

debt. See 91 C.J.S. Usury § 1 (1955).

The elements of usury are said to be

four: an unlawful intent, a loan or forbearance of money, an agreement that

the loan shall be repaid; the exaction of interest in excess of that permitted by
law. See 91 C.J.S. Usury § 13 (1955).
13. See Heilos v. State Land Co., 113 N.J. Eq. 239, 166 Atl. 330 (1933)
Moseley v. Brown, 76 Va. 419 (1882) ; Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378, 156
P.2d 408 (1945).
14. See note 13 supra.
15. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mid-West Chevrolet Co., 66
F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123,
1.10 So. 39 (1926); Verbeck v. Clymer, 220 Cal. 557, 261 Pac. 1017 (1927);
Cady L. Daniels, Inc. v. Fenton, 97 Colo. 409, 50 P.2d 62 (1935) ; Zazzaro v.
Colonial Acceptance Corp., 117 Conn. 251, 167 Atl. 734 (1933) ; Davidson v.
Davis, 59 Fla. 476, 52 So. 139 (1910) ; Richardson v. C.I.T. Corp., 60 Ga. App.
780, 5 S.E.2d 250 (1939) ; Bell v. Idaho Finance Co., 73 Idaho 560, 255 P.2d
715 (1953) ; Wernick v. National Bond & Inv. Co., 276 Ill. App. 84 (1934);
Robrock v. Ditzler, 113 Ind. App. 332, 47 N.E.2d 163 (1943) ; Atlas Securities
Co. v. Copeland, 124 Kan. 393, 260 Pac. 659 (1927) ; Munson v. White, 309
Ky. 295, 217 S.W.2d 641 (1949) ; Hartwick Lumber Co. v. Perlman, 245 Mich. 3,
222 N.W. 147 (1928); Dunn v. Midland Loan Finance Corp., 206 Minn. 550,
289 N.W. 411 (1939); Commercial Credit Co. v. Shelton, 139 Miss. 132, 104
So. 75 (1925) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68,
262 S.W. 425 (1924) ; Grand Island Finance Co. v. Fowler, 124 Neb. 514, 247
N.W. 429 (1933) ; Taylor v. Hintze, 57 N.J.L. 239, 30 At]. 551 (1894) ; Weaver
Hardware Co. v. Solomovitz, 235 N.Y. 321, 139 N.E. 353 (1923) ; Sayler v.
Brady, 63 N.D. 471, 248 N.W. 673 (1933) ; Mayer v. American Finance Corp.,
172 Okla. 419, 45 P.2d 497 (1935) ; Coast Finance Corp. v. Ira F. Powers Furniture Co., 105 Ore. 339, 209 Pac. 614 (1922) ; Equitable Credit & Discount Co.
v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941) ; Cohen v. Williams, 164 S.C. 499, 162
S.E. 758 (1932) ; Graham v. Universal Credit Co., 63 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933) ; Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945) ; Conway
y. Skidmore, 48 Wyo. 73, 41 P.2d 1.049 (1935).
16. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262
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vendor's compensation for the increased risk he incurs in the
17
credit sale; it is not interest on a loan of money to the vendee. '
The difference between the cash price and the credit price commonly called the "time price differential" - is not a charge
for forbearance of debt because the parties have agreed that the
entire credit price is not due at the time their bargain is made.
Since the time price differential is considered neither a loan nor
a forbearance of debt, usury statutes do not limit it: the parties
may make their own bargain as to it.
With equal plausibility, the time price differential might
have been considered a loan (if not of money, then of money's
equivalent)"' or a forbearance of debt. Several reasons may be
suggested why common law courts did not do so. Usury statutes
frequently have a penal aspect and require substantial forfeitures upon violation. 19 Therefore, they are commonly construed
strictly. 20 Further, the common law assumes that vendors and
vendees have equal bargaining power :21 "a purchaser is not like
the needy borrower, a victim of a rapacious lender, since he can
refrain from the purchase if he does not choose to pay the price
asked by the seller. ' 22 On this assumption neither needs protection against the other, and there is no need to limit their freedom to make their own bargain. In some cases, the court may
have been convinced that the complaining party simply was not
23
the sort of person that usury statutes were intended to protect.
S.W. 425 (1924). Accord, Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123,
110 So. 39 (1926); Atlas Securities Co. v. Copeland, 124 Kan. 393, 260 Pac.
659 (1927); Commercial Credit Co. v. Shelton, 139 Miss. 132, 104 So. 75
(1925).
17. See note 16 infra.
18. A loan of money's equivalent has been held within the ambit of usury
statutes. See Archer v. Putnam, 20 Miss. 286 (1849) ; State Bank v. Ayers, 7
N.J.L. 130 (1824).
19. See, e.g., CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. act 3757, § 3 (1919) allowing the borrower to collect three times the amount of interest paid as damages. In Nebraska,
the usury statutes are interpreted to require upon violation forfeiture of principal
and interest. See McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1
(1957).
20. See, e.g., Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schlanger, 284 Mich. 207, 278
N.W. 821 (1938) ; Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941) ; Crisman
v. Corbin, 169 Ore. 332, 128 P.2d 959 (1942) ; Frick Co. v. Tuten, 204 S.C. 226,
29 S.E.2d 260 (1944).
21. See VOLD, LAW OF SALES § 62 (1959).
22. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 78, 262
S.W. 425, 428 (1924).
23. Ibid. The facts of the case show that Weinrich owned an equity of some
$36,000 in two farms. It is understandable that the court might feel that Weinrich in no way resembled the "needy borrower" for whom the usury law offered
protection.
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Finally, a general hostility to usury statutes by bench, bar, and
24
business probably influenced the ultimate decision.
It became well settled as a general rule that usury statutes
do not apply to credit sales. 25 In the last two decades, however,
significant signs of change have appeared, mostly in cases concerning automobile sale transactions. These are now to be considered.
Deviations from the General Rule
As an exception to the general rule, it is agreed usury statutes apply to a loan disguised as a sale.2 6 Thus if the lender
takes title to the borrower's land for security purposes and reconveys it on repayment of the loan, the fact that the transaction takes the form of a sale-repurchase will not prevent judicial application of the usury statute.2 7 Purported sales of mortgages, 28 purported sales with an option to repurchase, 29 and purported sales of accounts with the vendor guaranteeing payment 30 have all been found to be disguised loans in particular
cases. In such cases the sale is a simulation and the true transaction is a loan, to which usury statutes apply. The result is
clearly the same if a purported credit sale of a motor vehicle is
a disguised loan, but in these transactions it is difficult to determine what fact situations will lead a court to rule that a particular transaction is in fact a disguised loan.
If the vendee alleges that the automobile sale was entirely
for cash, that he borrowed a sum from finance company to
complete the sale, that he executed a conditional sale contract
or chattel mortgage and promissory note solely at finance company's insistence, but finance company claims the note is for
the unpaid balance of a credit sale, there is an issue for the
trier of fact to resolve. 31 If the trier of fact resolves the issue
24. See Berger, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 148

(1935).
25. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
26. See Milo Theater Corp. v. National Theater Supply, 71 Idaho 435, 233

P.2d 425 (1951)
Dorothy v. Commonwealth Commercial Co., 278 Ill. 629, 116
N.E. 143 (1917) ; Bass v. Patterson, 68 Miss. 310, 8 So. 849 (1891) ; Osborne
v. Fuller, 92 S.C. 338, 75 S.E. 557 (1912). Cf. Adams v. Schwartz, 356 S.W.2d
597 (Tenn. App. 1961) ; Consumers Discount Corp. v. State, 352 S.W.2d 466
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962).

27. See Britz v. Kinsvater, 87 Ariz. 385, 351 P.2d 986 (1960) ; Wilcox v.
Moore, 354 Mich. 499, 93 N.W.2d 288 (1958).
28. See Dante v. Givens, 156 So. 2d 13 (Fla. App. 1963).
29. See Cowles v. Zlaket, 167 Cal. App. 2d 20, 334 P.2d 55 (1959).

30. See Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d 869 (1945).
31. See White v. Disher, 232 N.C. 260, 59 S.E.2d 798 (1950) ; United Tire
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in favor of the vendee, the local usury statute applies to the
transaction as it is a disguised loan, and a reviewing court is
unlikely to disturb the findings below. 32 Parol evidence is admissible, as it usually is if usury is in issue, to establish the
character of the transaction.3 3 The essential evidence to make
out a case for the vendee seems to be testimony that connects
finance company to vendee prior to, or during, the transaction
34
between vendor and vendee.
Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp.35 presents a variation of
this fact situation. Vendee alleged that he obtained a loan from
finance company-paid by finance company to vendor to complete a cash sale- and that the transaction was arranged by
an agent of both finance company and vendor. The common
agent may have been the salesman who sold the car. It was
held to be an error to dismiss the petition on demurrer -it
was for the jury to determine whether there was a disguised
loan to which the usury statute would apply. This was not an
ordinary time price agreement, the court explained, but allegedly
an agreement between vendor, vendee, and finance company
that the latter "would supply the money to cover the difference
between the cash price and down payment plus a charge for
the loan."'3 0 Realistically, the finance company does the same
thing when it purchases at a discount from the vendor the
vendee's note and the conditional sale contract: the considera& Investment Co. v. Trone, 189 Okla. 120, 113 P.2d 977 (1941); Nazarian v.
Lincoln Finance Corp., 77 R.I. 497, 78 A.2d 7 (1951).
32. See note 31 supra.
33. Parol admissible to establish usury: Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp.,
220 Ark. 56, 247 S.W.2d 1 (1952) ; Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d
335, 163 P.2d 869 (1945) ; Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 90 Ga. App. 352,
83 S.E.2d 76 (1954); Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W.2d 739
(1944) ; Yeager v. Ainsworth, 202 Miss. 747, 32 So. 2d 548 (1947) ; McNish v.
General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957) ; White v. Disher, 23!
N.C. 260, 59 S.E. 798 (1950) ; Simpson v. Penn Discount Corp., 335 Pa. 172,
5 A.2d 796 (1939) ; Associates Investment Co. v. Thomas, 210 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948) ; Clausing v. Virginia Lee Homes, 384 P.2d 644 (Wash. 1963).
34. See White v. Disher, 232 N.C. 260, 59 S.E.2d 798 (1950) ; United Tire &
Investment Co. v. Trone, 189 Okla. 120, 113 P.2d 977 (1941). But cf. Henry v.
P. & E. Finance Co., 197 Okla. 676, 174 P.2d 373 (1946). Compare Nazarian v.
Lincoln Finance Co., 77 R.I. 497, 78 A.2d 7 (1951) with Luchesi v. Capitol Loan
& Finance Co., 83 R.I. 151, 113 A.2d 725 (1955). Where vendee (Nazarian)
dealt directly' with finance company, reviewing court refused to disturb trial
court's finding that the transaction was a loan disguised as a sale; but where
vendee (Luchesi) did not deal directly with finance company, reviewing court
refused to disturb trial court's finding that the transaction was a bona fide sale.
35. 90 Ga. App. 352, 83 S.E.2d 76 (1954). Cf. Graham v. Lynch, 206 Ga.
301, 57 S.E.2d 86 (1950).
36. Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 90 Ga. App. 352, 356, 83 S.E.2d 76,
79 (1954).
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tion for the note and contract represents the difference between
the cash sale price and down payment; the discount represents
the charge the vendee must pay to recompense the finance company for supplying the balance of the cash price to the vendor.
The finance charge which vendor adds to his cash sale price
in a credit transaction is usually computed from charts supplied by finance company to assure that vendor will receive
exactly the difference between the cash sale price and down
payment when finance company discounts the paper.37 What,
then, distinguishes Jackson in legal effect from the ordinary
time price agreement? Perhaps it is the participation of finance
company, through the common agent, in the transaction between
vendor and vendee. Or perhaps it is the intention of the parties.
In either event, the decision makes it possible to find that
the purported credit sale is a disguised loan within the ambit of
the usury statute. If the result depends on the participation of
finance company, through an agent, in the transaction between
vendor and vendee, such participation may frequently be found.
The relationship between finance company and motor vehicle
vendor may frequently be so intimate that the vendor can be
deemed an agent of the finance company. If finance company
supplies the contract forms which vendor and vendee use, sets
the finance charge which vendor must assess, and customarily
discounts vendor's paper, little more needs to be added to conceive the vendor as an agent of finance company. In the context
of negotiable instruments law, there is considerable authority
for the proposition that a finance company may be too intimately
associated with vendor to become a holder in due course after
discounting his paper. 88 Such cases offer some support for a
finding that the vendor in an automobile sale is an agent of
37. See note 7 supra. The arrangement between vendor and finance company
may be even more intimate if the finance company rebates part of the finance
charge to vendor as an inducement for the vendor to sell his paper to finance company and not to its competitors. See BLACK, Buy Now, PAY LATER 193-196
(1963). The arrangement may also be complicated by finance company's undertaking to provide financial assistance ("flooring") to vendor in his dealings with
the automobile manufacturer.
38. "In a number of cases the courts appear to have used the legal microscope to find evidence of bad faith purchase of notes by finance companies from
dealers, obtained by the dealer in installment selling transactions. The evidence
of bad faith purchase seems to have been found from the close association of the
dealer and his discounting finance company." BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 112
(1961). See Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260
(1940); Commercial Credit Co. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal.2d
766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla.
1953); Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710
(1950). See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1 (1955).
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the finance company, and therefore, that the finance company
participates in the transaction between vendor and vendee. If
the character of the transaction depends upon the intention of
the parties, then what result if vendee contemplated a loan but
vendor and finance company contemplated a credit sale? Presumably it would be for the jury to decide what was the intention of the parties. A jury of consumers might be inclined to
agree with the vendee.
The federal usury statute 9 has been applied to a transaction which appears to differ little from an ordinary motor
vehicle credit sale in which a national bank acted as the finance

company. 40 The court characterized the transaction as a cash
sale plus a loan for the following reasons: a cash price, but
never a credit price, was quoted to vendee during negotiation
with vendor; vendee was told the "interest" would be 5% but
9.75% was actually charged; the purported credit price was
calculated by adding finance charge to the cash sale price; there
was an understanding from the beginning between vendor and
the bank on the purchase price intended to go to vendor and
the finance charge intended to go to the bank. 41 There is a
suggestion that the usury statute applies to any credit sale
the financing of which is prearranged by vendor and finance
company. 42 In light of ordinary business practices, the court's
39. 13 Stat. 108 (1864), 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1958). The statute is applicable to
national banks, and it limits also the discount rate on commercial paper.
40. Daniel v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
1955) ; rehearing denied, 228 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1956) ; adhered to on second
appeal, 239 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1956) ; cf. Beatty v. Franklin Investment Co., 319
F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Commercial Credit Corp., 242 F.2d
57 (5th Cir. 1957).
41. "Accordingly we repeat some of the indicia which influence us to hold
that these sales were at a cash price combined with a loan or extension of credit
as distinguished from a bona fide time price: (1) a standard product, a motor
vehicle, having a known and definite market price advertised and quoted only as
a cash price and not separately as a cash price and time price; (2) the only
price mentioned, except in the final papers, being a cash price and no time price
being actually agreed on; (3) the erroneous quoting to the purchaser of interest
at 5% within the legal rate; (4) the so-called time price being calculated on the
cash price by adding thereto insurance, recording fees and interest or discount;
(5) the clear separation from the beginning of the purchase price intended to go
to the seller of the vehicle from the interest or discount intended to go to the
Bank." Daniel v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 228 F.2d 803, 805 (5th
Cir. 1956). Query: are not these indicia present in most automobile sales transactions?
42. "The evidence leave us in no doubt that there was never any bona fide
'time price' in any one of the three contracts, but that the real transaction was
a sale at a cash price accompanied by a loan or extension of credit to which the
Bank was privy throughout. Any other result of the plain transactions here involved would leave that vast number of persons who purchase equipment and
vehicles on credit, the financing of which is pre-arranged between the dealer or
finance company, outside the pale of protection of the state and national laws
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suggestion embraces a large number of credit sales and would
be a substantial deviation from the general rule.
Texas courts have displayed a strong tendency to find a purported credit sale of an automobile to be a disguised loan to

which the usury statute applies. In the first such case, three
facts were taken as indicia of a disguised loan: the finance
company actively participated in the transaction between vendor
and vendee; finance company prepared and supplied vendor

with contract forms and with rate tables for computation of
finance charges; vendor quoted only the cash price to the yen-

dee. 43 In subsequent cases, the transaction was found to be a
disguised loan although finance company did not actively par-

ticipate in the transaction between vendor and vendee. 44 Associates Investment Co. v. Sosa45 is illustrative. The conditional
sale contract recited a cash price and a time balance. Parol
evidence showed that vendee was quoted only one price and
was not given a choice between a cash price and a credit price.
On this basis the court held the transaction a disguised usurious

loan. 46 Further the court held that the finance company had
notice of the usury (and hence was not a holder in due course
of the note) because the conditional sale contract was executed
47
on its printed contract form.

If the facts of a case show that finance company actively
participated in the transactions between vendor and vendee,
there may be a sound basis for holding that the transaction is
against usury." Daniel v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 227 F.2d 353,
357 (5th Cir. 1955).
43. Associates Investment Co. v. Thomas, 210 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948). "In the case before us the written conditional sales contract provides that
the car was being sold at a time selling price. . . . However, there is testimony
sufficient to show that the only price quoted to appellee was the cash price...;
that the seller told appellee that he would arrange for the financing of the deferred balance; that the matter was taken up with appellant before the sale was
made, that the latter checked appellee's credit and talked to her, and examined her
car, and agreed to finance the sale before it was made; and that appellant prepared the note and contract, and participated in the closing of the sale." Id. at
415. Cf. Associates Investment Co. v. Baker, 221 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
44. See Tyson v. Associates Investment Co., 331 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959); Associates Investment Co. v. Sosa, 241 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951) ; Associates Investment Co. v. Hill, 221 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
45. 241 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
46. "But if the selling price merely designates the means of computing the
amount the seller was to receive and buyer to pay, and, as a part of such transaction, an arrangement is made for financing a deferred balance in addition thereto which is in excess of 10%, same is usury, irrespective of whether the transaction was made at cash price or credit price." Id. at 706.
47. Id. at 704-05. The decision was legislatively overruled. See Lamb v. Ed
Maher, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
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a disguised loan. The parties may have agreed that finance
company should loan a portion of the sale price to vendor (paying it to vendor and to vendee) to complete a cash sale, although
it is believed the agreement of the parties ordinarily is otherwise. Finding a transaction to be a disguised loan because the
vendee was quoted only one sale price instead of being given a
choice between a cash price and a credit price seems dubious
logic. In cases such as Sosa it appears that the court is in fact
applying usury statutes to credit sales as a means of judicial
control of consumer finance enterprises.
That usury statutes apply to any transaction which is a
scheme or device to evade usury statutes is a second well-known
exception, closely related to and hardly distinguishable from the
exception of disguised loans, to the general rule that usury
statutes do not apply to credit sales. Thus one who made numerous small loans at maximum legal interest but required
each borrower to purchase for $30 a 90¢ bottle of vitamins
was promptly convicted for violating the Small Loans Act.4
The lender who charged small interest but required borrowers
to take out life, health, and accident insurance - on which
policies lender made an 85% commission- was convicted of
usury with equal dispatch.4 9 Such applications of the principle
are not provocative as the basic transaction between the parties
is transparently a loan.
A conditional sale contract could be employed to evade the
usury statute in a transaction which the parties intended to be
a loan. Such a case would probably give no court much difficulty. The use of a conditional sale of a motor vehicle for this
purpose, however, seems unlikely. Perhaps Seebold v. Eustermann ' ° is such a case. The court seems to have concluded that
this was a cash sale, vendor lending vendee sufficient cash to
satisfy the purchase price, and then simulating a credit sale
to secure greater interest on the loan than the law allowed. 51
48. People v. Coleman, 337 Mich. 247, 59 N.W.2d 276 (1953).
49. Tribble v. State, 89 Ga. App. 593, 80 S.E.2d 711 (1954). Accord, Coch-

ran v. State, 270 Ala. 440, 119 So. 2d 339 (1960) ; Strickler v. State Auto Finance Co., 220 Ark. 565, 249 S.W.2d 307 (1952) ; Peebles v. State, 87 Ga. App.
649, 75 S.E.2d 35 (1953) ; Carter v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 122 N.C. 338, 30
S.E. 341 (1898); cf. Griffin v. Kelly, 92 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1957); Family Loan
Co. of Nashville v. Ilickerson, 168 Tenn. 36, 73 S.W.2d 694 (1934) ; Thrift Finance Co. v. State, 351 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
50. 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W.2d 739 (1944).
51. "It is the general rule everywhere conceded, that when the sale is in fact
at an agreed cash price, and the form of a sale on credit is resorted to for the
purpose of evading the statute against usury, the transaction will be declared
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Seebold remains an isolated case, 52 later Minnesota cases reaffirming the general rule.5
Nebraska courts, which previously followed the general
rule, 54 recently have been most willing to find a credit sale of
a motor vehicle to be a scheme and device to evade the usury
statute.55 In the first of such cases, finance company actively
participated in the transaction between vendor and vendee, and
vendor testified that the time price differential included "interest." 6 The court held the transaction to be a scheme and
device to evade the usury statute and sustained vendee's defense
of usury.57 McNish v. General Credit Corp.5 8 established the

rule that a credit sale would be considered a scheme and device
to evade the usury statute unless the "buyer actually, was informed of and had an opportunity to choose between a time
sale price and a cash sale price."5 9 Regardless of the recitations
in the conditional sale contract, parol is admissible to show that
usurious." Id. at 575, 13 N.W.2d at 744. Cf. Hillman's v. Em'n'al's, 345 Mich.
644, 77 N.W.2d 96 (1956), which suggests the possibility of usury if the parties
in fact agreed on a cash sale. But see Black v. Contract Purchase Corp., 327
Mich. 636, 42 N.W.2d 768 (1950), in which the court rebuffed the Attorney General's attempt to regulate finance companies under Michigan's Small Loan Act.
The court was favorably impressed by the Attorney General's argument as to
social policy, but decided to leave the decision to the legislature. Hillman's may
reflect a change of opinion by the court.
52. The court was perhaps assisted to its conclusion by vendor's testimony in
which he referred to the added charge on the deferred balance as "interest." See
Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 575, 13 N.W.2d 739, 744 (1944).
53. See Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 93 N.W.2d 690
(1958).
54. See Grand Island Finance Co. v. Fowler, 124 Neb. 514, 247 N.W. 429
(1933).
55. See Wood v. Commonwealth Trailer Sales, 172 Neb. 494, 110 N.W.2d 87
(1961)
Curtis v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 166 Neb. 815, 91 N.W.2d 19
(1958) Nelson v. General Credit Corp., 166 Neb. 770, 90 N.W.2d 799 (1958)
McNish v. Grand Island Finance Co., 164 Neb. 543, 83 N.W.2d 13 (1957)
McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957) ; State ex rel.
Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956) ; Powell
v. Edwards, 162 Neb. 11, 75 N.W.2d 122 (1956).
56. See Powell v. Edwards, 162 Neb. 11, 75 N.W.2d 122 (1956).
57. "It is of course true, as has been pointed out by the decisions of this
court, that an automobile dealer may in good faith sell a car on time for a price
in excess of the cash price without tainting the transaction with usury, though
the difference in price may exceed lawful interest for a loan .... It is also true
that a time sale made in good faith at a price in excess of a cash price, even
though the difference exceeds lawful interest for a loan, which price is arrived
at by schedules furnished by a finance company which solicits contracts so entered
between a purchaser and a dealer, may not be regarded as being tainted with
usury. . . . These rules however do not apply where it is proved that the transaction was not made in good faith but that it was a scheme and a device pursued
to evade operation against it by the usury statutes." Id. at 18-19, 75 N.W.2d at
127.
58. 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957).
59. Id. at 537, 83 N.W.2d at 9.
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the vendee was never quoted two prices.60 The vendee's defense
of usury is available against finance company on the theory
that the vendor is its agent.6 1
Again it appears that the court is applying the usury statute
to transactions which are in fact credit sales. Surely there is a
bona fide sale if the parties intend a transfer of property for
money, as in McNish. It is submitted that the court entertained
no doubt that such was the intention of the parties, and that
the decision represents a retreat from the general rule that
usury statutes do not apply to credit sales.
Subsequent developments in Nebraska support this conclusion. In 1959 the legislature enacted an installment sales act
which allowed vendors to add greater time price differentials
to cash prices in credit transactions than the court allowed by
application of the usury statute.6 2 In Elder v. Doerri3 the
statute was declared unconstitutional as a local or special law
regulating the interest on money.6 4 After a summary of Ne60. See McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957).
61. Ibid.
62. NEB. REv. STAT. § 45-305 (Cum. Supp. 1959) : "(1) Notwithstanding the
provisions of any other law, the time price differential shall not exceed the following schedule:
"(a) As to motor vehicles:
"'CLASS 1. Any new motor vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a
year model not earlier than the year in which the sale is made-eight dollars
per one hundred dollars per year.
"CLASS 2. Any new motor vehicle not in Class 1 and any used motor vehicle
designated by the manufacturer by a year model of the same or not more than
two years prior to the year in which the sale is made -ten
dollars per one hundred dollars per year.
"CLASS 3. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 and designated by the
manufacturer by a year model not more than four years prior to the year in
which the sale is made - thirteen dollars per one hundred dollars per year.
"CLASS 4. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 or Class 3 and designated
by the manufacturer by a year model more than four years prior to the year in
which the sale is made- fifteen dollars per one hundred dollars per year.
"(b) As to goods other than motor vehicles: (i) On so much of the basic
time price as does not exceed three hundred dollars, twelve dollars per one hundred dollars per year; (ii) if the basic time price exceeds three hundred dollars,
but is one thousand dollars or less, ten dollars per one hundred dollars per year
on that portion over three hundred dollars; and (iii) if the basic time price
exceeds one thousand dollars, eight dollars per one hundred dollars per year on
that portion over one thousand dollars."
This statute has been attributed to the requests of the consumer finance industry. See Wall Street Journal Oct. 23, 1963, p. 1, col. 4.
63. 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963).
64. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18 (1875) : "The Legislature shall not pass local
or special laws in any of the following cases, that is to say . . . Regulating the
interest on money." The statute was held a local or special law because vendors
of motor vehicles were treated differently than vendors of other personal property,
and because four different classes of vehicles with four different allowable time
price differentials were created. The court held that such classification was "unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious," and that the act did not "operate uniform-
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braska doctrine on usury and credit sales, 65 the court, without
attempting to determine whether the installment contract in
question was bona fide or a cloak for usury, shifted to a study
of the installment sales act itself. This shift was rationalized
as follows: the parties stipulated that the contract was made
in conformity with the act; therefore, if the act provides for
usurious interest, the contract must be tainted with usury. 66 Due
to the peculiar wording of the statute,"7 the court concluded
that the charge designated as time "price differential was for
68
the forbearance of money and is, in fact, an interest charge"
which is at a usurious rate. Therefore the transaction made in

conformity with the unconstitutional statute was held void because of usury.69 Since the vendor had complied with the McNish
ly on the persons and property sought to be regulated." Elder v. Doerr, 122
N.W.2d 528, 537 (Neb. 1963). There may also be an idea akin to substantive
due process of law in the decision: "But this court has adhered to the principle
that the Legislature under the guise of regulation, may not indulge in arbitrary
price fixing, the destruction of lawful competition, or the creation of trade restraints tending to establish a monopoly." Id. at 532. An amended version of the
statute was declared unconstitutional in Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123
N.W.2d 844 (1963). The amended statute had deleted the offensive classifications, but was declared unconstitutional as a special law regulating interest because it applied only to retailers, "while all others, including manufacturers, distributors and all others having occasion to sell on an installment contract, are not
entitled to benefit by its provisions." 123 N.W.2d at 847.
65. "The general rule is that a sale of property for a price fixed by the seller
and accepted by the purchaser, if made in good faith, does not involve any question of usury. It is only when it is shown that such a transaction is a scheme
or artifice, to avoid the usury laws, that the courts will look through form and
determine the real nature of the transaction.
"Since the true nature of such financial transaction can only be determined
by the evidence in each particular case, uncertainty has arisen in a field where
certainty is desired. This court has consistently held that an installment time
sale which is in fact a loan is void if it is made in violation of the Nebraska
Installment Loan Act. It is question of fact as to whether or not a particular
transaction is a time sale made in good faith or the financing of the unpaid
balance of a cash purchase price. . . . A transaction is not a valid time sale made
in good faith unless the seller informs the buyer, at the time of the sale, of the
cash and time sales prices and gives the buyer an opportunity to choose the one
he will accept." Elder v. Doerr, 122 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Neb. 1963).
66. 122 N.W.2d at 533. The fallacy of this reasoning is pointed out in the
dissenting opinion: "The Installment Sales Act was intended to regulate valid
time sales. The act is not applicable to transactions which in fact are loans
made in violation of the Installment Loan Act. Consequently, if the retail installment contract involved in this case was not a valid time sale, then the Installment Sales Act is not involved and its constitutionality cannot be an issue
in the case. If the retail installment contract is in fact a time sale made in good
faith, then it is valid. . . . In that event, the constitutionality of the Installment
Sales Act cannot be an issue because the contract is valid without regard to the
statute." Id. at 537.
67. "Eight dollars per one hundred dollars per year," etc. See NEB. RV. STAT.
§ 45-305 (Cum. Supp. 1959).
68. Elder v. Doerr, 122 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Neb. 1963).
69. "The parties having stipulated that the time differential, which is in fact
interest, exceeds that amount, the installment sales contract is in fact a loan and
in violation of the Nebraska Installment Loan Act." Id. at 537.
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rule in this case- vendor had expressly given vendee a choice
between a cash price and a time price 0 - the case seems to
stand for the proposition that any transaction made in conformity with the Nebraska installment sales act is not a bona
fide credit sale but a scheme and device to evade the usury

statute.
In a subsequent case, the court found usury, although the
conditional sale contract listed a cash price and a time sale
2
price. 71 The time price differential was said to be interest.
Lloyd v. Gutgsel 73 announced that if the vendee is unable to
pay the quoted cash price, then application of a schedule of rates
to the cash price in order to determine the credit price makes
the difference between the two prices interest, and therefore
limited by the usury statute.74 This seems to be an open repudiation of the general rule that usury statutes do not apply to credit
sales.
One other jurisdiction has abandoned the general rule. The
general rule was well established in Arkansas 75 until 1952 in
spite of a self-operative constitutional provision on usury 76
70. Id. at 528.
71. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mackrill, 175 Neb. 631, 122 N.W.2d
742 (1963).
72. 122 N.W.2d at 746: "The transaction on its face shows a cash sale price
of $1,895, an allowance for the trade-in, and two additional charges for insurance.
The total of $1,349.47 is shown to be the basic time price. The only apparent
conclusion is that the amount of $1,349.47 is financed. There is then an item
designated as the time price differential of $231.22. Regardless of the term use&"
this item is a charge for the loan of money or for forbearance of debt. Disguise
it by any name or title we will, it is and remains interest."
73. 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963).
74. "There seems to be an impression that if a cash price is quoted and the
buyer is unable to pay cash, it is then possible to apply a certain schedule of
rates of charges to the cash price in order to determine the time sale price, the
difference being denominated a time price differential. It is possible to do so if
the resulting charge does not exceed 9 percent simple interest. If it does, we
have a usurious transaction. Where a time sale price is determined by applying
a certain schedule of rates or charges to the cash price, the resulting product is
interest. This is merely a sale for a cash price, with the difference between the
money the buyer has and what he needs being financed. When we look through
the form, can we come to any other conclusion but the one that the difference
between the price and what the buyer finally pays is the cost of carrying the
balance of the cash price? To put it another way, the charge is for the forbearance to collect the full cash price, or for the use of money." 124 N.W.2d at
203-04.
75. See Garst v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 211 Ark. 526, 201 S.W.2d
757 (1947) ; Harper v. Futrell, 204 Ark. 822, 164 S.W.2d 995 (1942) ; General
Contract Purchase Corp. v. Holland, 196 Ark. 675, 119 S.W.2d 535 (1938)
Cheairs v. McDermott Motor Co., 175 Ark. 1126, 2 S.W.2d 1111 (1928)
Standard Motors Finance Co. v. Mitchell Auto Co., 173 Ark. 875, 293 S.W. 1026
(1927) ; Smith v. Kaufman, 145 Ark. 548, 224 S.W. 978 (1920).
76. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13 (1874) : "All contracts for a greater rate of
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which could have been construed to apply to credit sales. In
Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp.77 the court in effect
prospectively overruled the earlier cases, 78 and warned that in
the future the constitutional provision might be applied to certain credit sales. After explaining the reason for the reversal
of policy, 79 the court listed three propositions as applicable to
future cases: (1) In a bona fide transaction, vendor could increase his cash price to compensate for the increased risk of a
credit sale. 0 (2) If finance company discounts vendor's paper
so that it receives more than 10% return on its investment,
and if vendor increased his cash price to allow this result under
reasonable assurance that finance company would discount the
paper, the entire transaction is impeachable for usury."' (3) If
finance company supplies vendor with forms and rate charts,
interest than 10 percent per annum shall be void, as to principal and interest, and

the General Assembly shall prohibit the same by law.
77. 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
78. "But the time has come when we must re-examine these holdings, so we
now give the public a caveat that the effect of transactions, such as in the case
at bar, may impinge the constitutional mandate against usury, and transactions
entered into after this appeal becomes final may be subjected to the taint of
usury with the aforementioned decisions affording no protection." Id. at 607,
249 S.W.2d at 977. The court listed the cases cited in note 73 supra.
79. "Our cases disclose that finance companies have seized upon the 'credit
price rule' as a means of obtaining more than 10% return upon what is in form
a sale, but is in substance, a loan. It is obvious that if a prospective purchaser
of a car, radio, refrigerator, etc., should borrow $1000 directly from a finance
company, then buy the article with the money and execute a one year note to the
finance company for $1,200, such transaction would be usurious. But the finance
,companies are accomplishing the same result by having dealers in cars, radios,
-refrigerators, etc., handle the sale in the first instance, and under the guise of a
credit price, add an excessive charge which inures to the finance company, because the dealer is reasonably confident in advance of the sale that he can transfer the paper to the finance company for his own cash price. Nor is the increase
purely for credit risk, because the car, radio, refrigerator, etc. is usually insured
against normal hazards.
"The result is that, by the simple expedient of providing forms and a rating
book to the seller, and buying the conditional sale contract and note from him,
the finance companies are receiving a usurious rate of interest. . . . Buying at
a credit price, as distinguished from a cash price, has largely disappeared in fact,
but it is being used as a cloak for usury in many cases by such words as 'time
price differential,' or some other such language." Id. at 608-09, 249 S.W.2d at
977-78.
80. "We leave unimpaired the doctrine that a seller may, in a bona fide transaction, increase the price to compensate for the risk that is involved in a credit
sale. But there may be a question of fact as to whether the so-called credit price
was bona fide as such, or only a cloak for usury." Id. at 609, 249 S.W.2d at 978.
81. "If the seller, whether he has quoted two prices to the purchaser or not,
subsequently transfers title documents to an individual or company which is engaged in the business of purchasing such documents, at a price which permits the
transferee to obtain more than 10% on its investment, then a question of fact
arises as to whether the seller increased his cash price with the reasonable assurance that he could so discount the paper to such individual or finance company.
If that reasonable assurance existed, then the transaction is in substance a loan,
and may be attacked for usury." Id. at 609, 249 S.W.2d at 978.
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this is good evidence that vendor had reasonable assurance that
8 2
finance company would discount his paper.
Although Hare purports to leave intact the doctrine that
vendor may increase his sale price to compensate for the increased risk of a credit sale despite the usury law, practically
Hare abandons the general rule and applies the usury law to
motor vehicle sales. The thesis of Hare is that the usury law
applies to limit finance company's return on investment whenever vendor fixes his credit sale price under reasonable assurance that finance company will discount his paper.8- Given the
realities of automobile financing, vendor will frequently have
the reasonable assurance contemplated by the decision.8 4 Since
usury is a real defense in Arkansas, vendee can urge the defense
against finance company even if it is a holder in due course of
his note.8 5
Subsequently, the usury law was applied not only to threeparty transactions,80 but also to transactions involving vendor
and vendee alone.87 Sloan v. Sears Roebuck & Co.88 decisively
rejected the contention that participation of a finance company
was necessary to taint a credit sale with usury. The difference
between cash price and credit price, according to the court,
amounts to a forbearance of debt, and is, therefore, interest.8 9
82. "When the finance companies or purchasers of title paper supply dealers
with a set of forms and schedule for credit price increases, such will tend to show
that the dealer had reasonable assurance that such finance company or purchaser
of the paper would take the paper at such discount." Id. at 609, 249 S.W.2d
at 978.
83. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Avery, 225 Ark. 190, 280 S.W.2d
229 (1955)
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Stanley, 225 Ark. 96, 279 S.W.2d
556 (1955)
General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Duke, 223 Ark. 938, 270
S.W.2d 918 (1954). The cases immediately after Hare involved transactions
which were completed prior to that decision. The court applied pre-Hare law to
these. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Hale, 225 Ark. 78, 279 S.W.2d 281
(1955); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Crossley, 222 Ark. 278, 258 S.W.2d
562 (1953)
Kensinger Acceptance Corp. v. Tippet, 222 Ark. 199, 258 S.W.2d
561 (1953); Perry v. Duncan, 222 Ark. 160, 258 S.W.2d 560 (1953) ; Aunspaugh v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 Ark. 141, 258 S.W.2d 559 (1953) ; Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, 222 Ark. 140, 258 S.W.2d 558 (1953) ; Crisco
v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 Ark. 127, 258 S.W.2d 551 (1953).
84. See the cases cited in the preceding note. But cf. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. v. Hudgens, 234 Ark. 668, 356 S.W.2d 658 (1962).
85. See Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d
973 (1952).
86. See cases cited in note 83 supra.
87. See Heidelberg Southern Sales Co. v. Tudor, 229 Ark. 500, 316 S.W.2d
716 (1958) ; Kyser v. T. M. Bragg & Sons, 228 Ark. 578, 309 S.W.2d 198 (1958) ;
Sloan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1958); Holland
v. C. T. Doan Buick Co., 228 Ark. 340, 307 S.W.2d 538 (1957) ; Jones v. Jones,
227 Ark. 836, 301 S.W.2d 737 (1957).
88. 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1958).
89. See Sloan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1958).
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Thus, in two-party transactions, the usury law limits the amount
by which vendor may increase his credit price over cash price.
Given this proposition, Arkansas has completely repudiated the
general rule that usury laws do not apply to credit sales. 90
That usury statutes do not apply to credit sales is still the
majority position at common law." Since 1950, however, there
has developed a respectable body of case law which limits or
repudiates the majority position. Arkansas and Nebraska seem
to have reached the logical terminus of the decisions previously
considered which found a credit sale to be a disguised loan or
a scheme to avoid the usury law. Those decisions appear frequently to apply usury statutes, without admitting it, to transactions which in reality are credit sales. The remaining question is whether these deviations from the general rule can be
supported.
Policy Considerations
The decisions applying usury statutes to credit sales seem
to be based on the belief that judicial regulation of consumer
finance enterprises is desirable. 2 The arguments in favor of
90. But of. Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Rudgens, 234 Ark. 668, 356 S.W.2d 659
(1962), in which the court uses language of pre-Hare decisions. Adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code by Arkansas, however, has been said not to affect the
usury law. See Cooper v. Cherokee Village Development Co., 364 S.W.2d 158
(Ark. 1963).
91. See cases cited note 15 supra. Recent cases in accord: Langille v. CentralPenn Nat'l Bank of Philadelphia, 156 A.2d 410 (Del. 1959) ; Beatty v. Franklin
Investment Co., 179 A.2d 913 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962) ; Certified Motors v. Nolan
Loan Co., 122 A.2d 227 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956); Brooks v. Auto Wholesalers,
101 A.2d 255 (D.C. Mun. App. 1953) ; Lincoln Loan Service of Takoma Park v.
Motor Credit Co., 83 A.2d 230 (D.C. Mun. App. 1951) ; Nelson v. Scarritt Motors, 48 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1950); Bell v. Idaho Finance Co., 73 Idaho 560, 255
P.2d 715 (1953) ; Munson v. White, 309 Ky. 295, 217 S.W.2d 641 (1949) ; Van
Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 93 N.W.2d 690 (1958) ; Bryant v.
Securities Investment Co., 233 Miss. 740, 102 So. 701 (1958); Wyatt v. Commercial Credit Corp., 341 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. App. 1960); Thomas v. Knickerbocker Operating Co., 108 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1951)
Carolina Industrial Bank v.
Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963)
Cobb v. Baxter, 292 P.2d 389
(Okla. 1956); Brown v. Crandall, 218 S.C. 124, 61 S.E.2d 761 (1950); Hallstrom v. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d 111, 378 P.2d 355 (1963) ; of. Blue River Sawmills
v. Gates, 225 Ore. 439, 358 P.2d 239 (1960); Maestro Music, Inc. v. Rudolph
Wurlitzer Co., 88 Ariz. 222, 354 P.2d 266 (1960). The cited cases from the District of Columbia should be reconsidered in view of Beatty v. Franklin Investment Co., 319 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1963), reversing Beatty v. Franklin Investment Co., 179 A.2d 913 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962).
92. Cf.: "Any other result of the plain transactions here involved would leave
that vast number of persons who purchase equipment and vehicles on credit, the
financing of which is pre-arranged between the dealer or finance company, outside the place of protection of the state and national laws against usury." Daniel
v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 227 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1955).
"Buying at a credit price, as distinguished from a cash price, has largely dis-
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some kind of regulation of this area have often been presented.9 3
There is little logic in affording protection to the consumer who
borrows cash to facilitate a purchase while refusing the same
protection to the consumer who purchases on credit. There is
even less logic in the distinction when the price the consumer
must pay for credit is in reality fixed in advance by a finance
company and the vendor. The equality of bargaining power
between vendor and vendee assumed by the common law is
hardly realistic in motor vehicle sales as automobiles are frequently considered necessities and most vendees must purchase
on credit or not at all. The serious abuses present in consumer
financing are well known :94 exorbitant finance charges, failure
appeared in fact, but it is being used as a cloak for usury in many cases by such
words as 'time price differential' or some other such language." Hare v. General
Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 609, 249 S.W.2d 973, 977 (1952).
93. See Berger, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 148
(1935) ; Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 CORN.
L.Q. 38 (1958) ; Nugent & Henderson, Installment Selling and the Consumer,
173 ANNALS 93 (1934) ; Notes, 71 HA v. L. REV. 1143 (1958) ; 18 U. PITT. L.
REV. 744 (1952), 60 YALE L.J. 1218 (1951). See also Hare v. General Contract
Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
94. "Many sharp practices had developed in unregulated installment selling,
such as failure to make adequate disclosure of all the terms of the bargain, and
exorbitant credit charges. The inferior financial status of most installment buyers, and the fact that they are often ignorant of their legal rights, have made the
position of the retail dealer and finance company dominant throughout the transaction. The carrying charge, or differential between the cash price of an article
and its price on the installment plan, generally ranges between 11 and 40 per
cent on the credit actually obtained. Moreover, it has been the practice to compute the carrying charge on the original unpaid balance for the full installment
period rather than on the decreasing amounts as payments are made. Furthermore the use of widely varying and frequently incomprehensible formula to set
forth the charge hinders the buyer in canvassing competing sources of consumer
credit for the most advantageous terms." WHITNEY, LAW OF MODERN COMMERCIAL PRACTICES §655 (1958).
See generally BLACK, BuY Now, PAY LATER
(1963) ; Berger, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 148
(1935). For a practical catalogue of abuses consider the following paraphrase of
the Attorney General's petition in State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp.,
162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956) : "Defendant corporation is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Associates Investment Company, an Indiana corporation. . . . Defendants, without having procured a license to operate an installment loan business in this state, have conducted such business with the intent of evading the
usury laws of the state; and have engaged in a device and subterfuge by means
of which they have exacted excessive, unlawful, exorbitant, unconscionable, and
usurious charges for the making of installment loans to purchasers of automobiles. For the purpose of carrying out such device and subterfuge, defendant corporation purports to be engaged solely in the business of purchasing, at a discount, from automobile dealers, notes and mortgages covering the sale of automobiles, but in fact none of such contracts represent bona fide sale transactions but
constitute direct loans by defendant corporation to the purchasers of such automobiles.
"Defendants solicit automobile dealers to finance their purported time sale
transactions, and as an inducement and consideration therefor offer and agree
to rebate to such dealers a percentage of the charges made to the purchasers, and
chattel mortgage and note forms are furnished such dealers by defendants. In the
sale of automobiles, purchasers are not quoted agreed time sales prices but only
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to disclose the true cost of credit, 95 add-on contracts, balloon
the cash price is mentioned, . . . and such purchasers are then required to sign
a note and mortgage in blank.
"Thereafter, such blank instruments are delivered to defendant Kemnitz or
some other agent of defendant corporation . . . and such blank instruments are
taken to the office of defendant corporation where the interest and other charges
are inserted in such contracts. The interest included in the contracts is clearly
in excess of 9 per cent per annum, and in addition thereto charges are added for
property damage insurance on the automobile, and in most cases also for health
and accident or credit life insurance, or both, although no application is made
for such insurance by the borrower and such charges are made without their
knowledge or consent. The property damage insurance is placed with Emmco Insurance Company, an Indiana corporation, which is another wholly owned subsidiary of Associates Investment Company. The charges made for such insurance
are excessive and unreasonable amounts and constitute additional charges for the
use of money advanced to the borrower by defendants.
"Because there is no contract between the buyer and seller as to any credit
price, defendants control the entire financial transaction, and defendant corporation is in fact the principal in such financial transaction. However, in order to
make the transaction appear to be a bona fide time sale agreement between buyer
and seller, and to further carry out said device and subterfuge, the note and
mortgage are made payable to the dealer who in turn purports to endorse same to
defendant corporation without recourse.
"Also, in order to secure additional excessive, unlawful, and usurious charges,
the majority of such loans are made for a period of 1 year, with the first 11
monthly payments being in equal amounts, the twelfth payment consisting of a
large or balloon payment. In most cases, the borrower is unable to make such
balloon payment when due, and defendants then make a new loan and require
the borrower to sign a new note and mortgage. . . . Included in such note and
mortgage is the amount of the balloon payment together with interest in an
excessive and usurious amount . . . and in addition thereto, as a condition to
the making of the loan, charges are made for property damage insurance on the
automobile together with additional charges for health and accident, or credit
life insurance, or both. . . . The new contract usually provides for equal monthly
installments, with the final payment being a balloon payment.
"Due to the unlawful, exorbitant, and confiscatory charges made upon these
loans, the amount applied to the principal balance each year is small, and the
loan contract is rewritten numerous times before the borrower is able to make
final payment. This method of operation by defendants is contrary to the declared
public policy of the State of Nebraska ...
"These loans are made to persons of moderate means, including a large number of service men whose circumstances make it necessary for them to secure
credit in order to own an automobile for business purposes, to furnish transportation to and from work, and for family use. Due to the unlawful, exorbitant,
and confiscatory charges made on such loans, the interest of the borrower in the
automobile given as security is reduced to such an extent that it becomes impossible for such borrowers to secure loans from other sources; and 'that if a borrower fails to meet the payments demanded by the defendants on such void and
unlawful loans the defendants threaten to and do replevin the automobile of such
borrower' who is not in a position to defend against the collection method used
by defendants to enforce payment of the unlawful, void, and unconscionable
loans." Id. at 689-92, 77 N.W.2d at 221-22. In states following the majority rule
defendant's mode of business probably is legal.
95. Installment purchasers are practically never quoted the credit charge in
terms of simple annual interest. Instead they are told that it is, say 6%, usually
meaning 6% of the original unpaid balance multiplied by the number of years for
payment. See BLACK, Buy Now, PAY LATER 75-98 (1963). Such finance charges
may be converted into simple annual interest (approximately) by the following
formula:
2
pC
r =

A (n + :1)
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notes, and the like. Regulation of some kind to cure such abuses
has enjoyed increasing support 6
The arguments for regulation, if accepted, do not compel
the conclusion that the regulation should be judicial application
of the local usury statute to credit sales. Rather, the indicated
conclusion seems to be that a comprehensive retail installment
sales act is desirable. By applying usury statutes to credit sales,
courts can control primarily only one of the abuses in consumer
financing - exorbitant finance charges - unless the court is to
undertake, by expansion of the usury concept, policing of the
entire consumer financing enterprise. The latter task seems
more appropriate for an administrative agency than for a court.
Moreover, there is at least doubt whether consumer financing
can be profitably conducted under the limits which would be
imposed by existing usury statutes.9 7 On the other hand, in the
absence of a retail installment sales act, 98 judicial application of
usury statutes to credit sales has two merits: (1) unconscionable bargains may be conveniently denied enforcement; (2)
some control, albeit crude, of the worst abuses of consumer
financing is made possible where otherwise none at all is available. A possible side effect might be to stimulate adoption of
r p =
C =
A =
n =

annual interest rate.
number of payment periods in 1 year exclusive of down payment.
interest or finance charge in dollars.
amount borrowed.
number of equal installment payments in whole contract period exclusive of
down payment. Id. at 229.
96. The enactment of retail installment sales acts by more than 30 states is
one measure of the support.
97. Compare Becker, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
138 (1935) with Eckor, Commentary on "Usury in Instalment Sales," id. at 173.
The percentage of loss in consumer sale transactions has been reported to be less
than one half of one percent, which is obviously relevant to the controversy.
WINCnEFSTER, CONSUMER INSTALLMENT LOAN LOSSES AND VALUATION RESERVES
14 (1955). Presumably, consumer financing has not disappeared in Arkansas in
spite of the applicability of the local usury law. In Nebraska, an estimated billion dollars worth of goods were purchased by contracts complying with the Installment Sales Act declared unconstitutional in Elder v. Doerr. A significant
decrease in credit sales was reported shortly thereafter. Wall Street Journal,
Oct. 23, 1963, p. 1, col. 4. Another facet of the problem stems from the various
forfeitures which frequently result from violation of the usury statute. Nebraska
is an extreme example. In the context of a purported credit sale which is found
to violate the usury statute, the vendee retains the goods, his note is void and
uncollectible, and he may recover any payments made thereof. See McNish v.
General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957).
98. With the possible exception of Nazarian v. Lincoln Finance Co., 77 R.I.
497, 78 A.2d 7 (1951) no case was found in an important commercial state which
indicated that the court would consistently apply the usual statute to credit
sales. Significantly, all important commercial states have retail installment sales
acts of some form.
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a retail installment sales act. These advantages are real and
perhaps will appear convincing to more courts in the future.
USURY AND CREDIT SALES: LOUISIANA

At an early date Louisiana courts decided that usury statutes
apply to loans but not to sales.9 9 This doctrine has been reaffirmed in twentieth century cases arising out of credit sales
of automobiles. 10 0 The automobile cases rely on the early Louisiana decision and a leading common law case' 0 as authority.
Thus Louisiana appears to follow the general rule that usury
statutes do not apply to credit sales.
It is submitted that the provisions of the Civil Code do not
compel the conclusion that our usury statutes are inapplicable
to credit sales. The basic usury statute10 2 is significantly different from the typical usury statute in common law jurisdictions. First, article 2924 as modified by R.S. 9:3501 is scarcely

a penal statute since the only sanction for usurious interest is
loss of all interest.'0 3 Second, interest in Louisiana law has a

somewhat different meaning than in the common law. Moreover, specific code provisions on interest and sales' 0 4 apparently
99. Mills v. Crocker, 9 La. Ann. 334 (1854).
100. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Swain, 176 So. 636 (La. App.

1st Cir. 1937) ; Robbins v. Page & Sons, 120 So. 683 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929);
of. Borel v. Living, 28 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946).
101. Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39 (1926).
102. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2924 (1870) : "Interest is either legal or conventional. Legal interest is fixed at the following rates, to wit:
"At five per cent on all sums which are the object of a judicial demand.
Whence this is called judicial interest;
"And on sums discounted at banks at the rate established by their charters.
"The amount of conventional interest cannot exceed eight per cent. The same
must be fixed in writing; testimonial proof of it is not admitted in any case.
"Except in the cases herein provided, if any persons shall pay on any contract
a higher rate of interest than the above, as discount or otherwise, the same May
be sued for and recovered within two years from the time of payment ....
103. LA. R.S. 9:3501 (1950) : "Any contract for the payment of interest in
excess of that authorized by law shall result in the forfeiture of the entire interest
so contracted." This provision combined with article 2924 seem to be the only
penalty for usury in Louisiana. Compare the provisions in other jurisdictions
mentioned in note 19 supra.
104. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2553 (1870) : "The buyer owes interest on the price
of the sale, until the payment of the capital, in the three following cases:
"1. If it has been so agreed at the time of the sale.
"2. If the thing sold produces fruit, or any other income.
"3. From the date of the sale when the price is then due."
Id. art. 2552: "When the seller has granted to the buyer a term for the payment, the interest begins to run from the end of that term."
Id. art. 2781: "A contract of sale, in which it is stipulated that the price shall
be paid at a future time, but that it bears interest from the day of the sale, is
not a contract of rent."
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were not considered in cases which announce that usury statutes
do not apply to credit sales.
In the civil law, interest is a form of moratory damages:
it is the damages recoverable for delay in performance of an
obligation to pay money. 10 5 Unless the parties stipulate to the
contrary, all debts bear legal interest. 10 6 The same code article
fixes the rate of legal interest and the maximum rate of conventional interest.0 7 Since all debts bear legal interest unless the
parties stipulate otherwise, in which event the debt bears conventional interest, the limit on conventional interest is applicable
to any transaction which creates a debt and not to loans only.
If the parties stipulate what rate of interest a debt shall bear,
they are bound by the provisions of article 2924 regardless of
the transaction which created the debt.
Louisiana courts have recognized this in a series of cases
on bond for deed contracts, contracts which are fundamentally
conditional sales. A common stipulation in such contracts gave
the vendor the right to take possession of the property upon
default by the vendee and to forfeit all payments made theretofore by the vendee. Our courts have declared the forfeiture
provision null: since the vendee's obligation was to pay money,
interest not in excess of the rate permitted by article 2924 was
08
the only damages the vendor could collect.
105. Id. art. 1935: "The damage due for delay in the performance of an obligation to pay money are called interest. The creditor is entitled to these damages
without proving any loss, and whatever loss he may have suffered he can recover
no more."

Id. art. 1936: "Interest is of two kinds, conventional and legal; the rate of
both is fixed by law in the chapter on loans on interest."
Id. art. 1937: "In contracts stipulating a conventional interest, it is due without demand from the time stipulated for its commencement until the principal
is paid."

Id. art. 1938: "All debts shall bear interest at the rate of five per centum
per annum, from the time they become due unless otherwise stipulated."
106. Id. art. 1938.
107. Id. art. 2924.
108. Ekman v. Vallery, 185 La. 488, 169 So. 521 (1936) ; Heeb v. Codifer &
Bonnabel, 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926) ; cf. Scott v. Apgar, 238 La. 29, 113
So. 2d 457 (1959) ; Louisiana Delta Farms Co. v. Davis, 202 La. 445, 12 So. 2d
213 (1943) ; Farthing v. Neely, 129 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied; Canepa v. Jackson, 18 So. 2d 64 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944) ; Southwest

Improvement Co. v. Whittington, 193 So. 483 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940) ; Rainey
v. McCrocklin, 185 So. 705 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939) ; Cointment v. Segrest, 184
So. 360 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938) ; Chauvin v. Theriot, 180 So. 847 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1938) ; Victor v. Lewis, 157 So. 293 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934) ; Subdivision Realty Co. v. Woulfe, 135 So. 71 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1931) ; Schluter
v. Gentilly Terrace Co., 8 La. App. 422 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928). The later
cases frequently deny the forfeiture

on the theory

that it

represents punitive

damages, that it is without consideration, or simply because it is inequitable.
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Since the bond for deed cases show that article 2924 applies
to transactions other than a loan, 1°9 may not that article also
apply to a credit sale? The Code teaches that the vendee owes
interest on the price in a sale if the parties so agree, if the
thing sold produces fruit, or from the date of the sale when
the price is then due.110 The third case recited seems to refer
to a cash sale and is simply an application of article 1938111 to
a sale: since the price is then due, legal interest on the debt
accrues.112 The second case also refers to legal interest; in a
number of early cases, the court held that legal interest is due
for the price of property, usually land, producing fruit.1 1 3 What
then is meant in the first case- interest is due if the parties
so agree at the time of the sale? Presumably if the vendee
gives a promissory note bearing interest from date to cover the
sale price, the parties have agreed that the vendor is entitled
to interest on the price. The rate of interest could not exceed
that permitted by article 2924. Is the character of the transaction altered if the vendor offers to sell for $500 cash or for
$600 on credit to be paid in monthly installments and the vendee
elects to buy on credit? In substance the two transactions seem
identical: the parties have agreed that the vendor is ultimately
entitled to an additional sum beyond the cash sale price in lieu
of immediate payment thereof. In short, the parties seem to
have agreed that the vendor shall have damages for the vendee's
delay in performing an obligation to pay money. If so, any such
agreement is an agreement for interest and the rate of interest
cannot exceed that permitted by article 2924.114
The better theory is that of Eckman v. Vallery, that there is an unlawful rate
of interest. See Comment, 33 TUL. L. REv. 180, 195 (1958).
109. The bond for deed contract in substance is a conditional sale. Technically, it is a contract to sell and not a sale.
110. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2553 (1870) : "The buyer owes interest on the price
of the sale, until the payment of the capital in the three following cases:
"1. If it has been so agreed at the time of the sale.
"2. If the thing sold produces fruits, or any other income.
"3. From the date of the sale when the price is then due."
111. Id. art. 1938: "All debts shall bear interest at the rate of five per centum
per annum from the time they become due, unless otherwise stipulated."
112. Cf. id. art. 2554: "When the seller has granted the buyer a term for the
payment, the interest begins to run from the end of that term." This is another
application of article 1938: the debt is not due until the end 'of the term; therefore legal interest accrues only from that date. See Hughes v. Mattes, 104 La.
231, 28 So. 1009 (1900).
113. See Balph v. Hoggart, 2 La. Ann. 462 (1847) ; Minor v. Alexander, 6
Rob. 166 (La. 1843) ; Gay v. Kendig, 2 Rob. 472 (La. 1842) ; Barker v. Banks,
15 La. 453 (1840); Caldwell v. His Creditors, 9 La. 265 (1836); Franklin v.
Verbois, 6 La. 727 (1834).
114. See Griffin v. His Creditors, 6 Rob. 216 (La. 1843) (credit sale) ; Patterson v. Bonner, 14 La. 214 (1839) (sale with right of redemption) ; Dendinger
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Since the difference between the cash sale price and the
credit sale price represents an additional sum which the vendor
ultimately receives in lieu of immediate payment of the cash
sale price, it is submitted that the additional sum is interest
whether the parties call it interest, finance charge, time price
differential, or something else. The "service charge" paid on a
revolving charge account would seem even more clearly to be
interest.115 Against these conclusions, a vendor might protest
that the finance charge does not represent damages; rather it
is compensation for the increased risk incurred in a credit sale
and for the increased overhead resulting from the additional
bookkeeping. 11 6 There are two answers to this argument. The
short answer is that for delay in performance of an obligation
to pay money, a creditor may recover interest and nothing more
"whatever loss he may have suffered.' 1 1 7 The other answer is
that a vendor hardly stands, with respect to risk and overhead,
in a different position than a lender of money, and it has never
been doubted that the latter's charge is interest. 118 On principle,
it seems that in a credit sale the parties agree that the vendor
is entitled to interest on the cash price. If so, the usury statute
applies; the rate of interest cannot exceed that permitted by
law.
Should it be held that the Louisiana usury statutes apply to
credit sales, the defense of usury would not be available to the
vendee in every case. By the terms of article 2924, if the interest is capitalized and included as part of the principal in a
promissory note, any holder may collect the face amount of the
note provided it bears no more than 8% per annum interest
after maturity.11 9 Even the payee can collect the face amount
v. Emuy & Eichhorn, 124 So. 604 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929)

(sale).

In

each

case the court found unlawful interest in a sale transaction.
115. Revolving charge accounts operate on the following pattern. Vendee is
given a maximum (e.g., $500) to which he may purchase on credit. Monthly
payments are made on the account. Usually vendee is given six months to pay.
If vendee purchases up to the maximum during the first month, then after his
first payment on account his indebtedness is below the maximum and he may
make further credit purchases during the following month until the maximum is
again reached. The service charge is commonly 1Y2% per month or 18% per
annum simple interest. See Consumer Labelling Bill (Hearings on S. 2755) Before
a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess., 123 (1960).
116. See Ecker, Commentary on "Usury in Instalment Sales," 2 LAW &
CONTEMI'. PROB. 173 (1935).
117. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1935 (1870), quoted note 105 supra.
118. See Berger, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 148
(1935).
119. "The owner or discounter of any note or bond or other written evidence
of debt for the payment of money, payable to order of bearer or by assignment,
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of the note regardless of the amount of interest capitalized. 12
Time Finance Co. v. Louis121 is an extreme example. Vendee
had an unpaid balance of $2691.45 on a car. He borrowed this
sum from finance company who required that he sign a promissory note for $4200.00 payable in 24 months - $75.00 per month
for the first 23 months and $1975.00 for the last month. In
other words, after 23 months, vendee would have reduced by
only $717.45 the amount which he actually received while paying over $1000 capitalized interest. Being unable to meet the
final balloon installment ($1800 was still due after vendee's
best effort) vendee "refinanced," i.e., he issued a new promissory note for $2952.00 payable in three years. The capitalized
interest in this note amounts to more than 40% per annum.
Neither note was considered usurious, and finance company
recovered on the second note. 122 The case graphically illustrates
that if vendee gives a promissory note there is no legal limit
on the amount of finance charge (interest) which may be included in the face amount of the note. Promissory notes are
commonly given in motor vehicle purchases but not in purchases
on a revolving charge account.
If it is held that usury statutes apply to credit sales, the
Small Loans Act

23

may determine in some cases whether the

vendee can urge usury as a defense. Under this act the permissible rate of interest depends on whether the creditor is a
shall have the right to claim and recover the full amount of such note, bond or
other written evidence of debt and all interest not beyond eight per cent per
annum interest that may accrue thereon, notwithstanding that the rate of interest
or discount at which the same may be or may have been discounted has been
beyond the rate of eight per cent per annum interest of discount but this provision shall not apply to the banking institutions of this State in operation under
existing laws.
"The owner of any promissory note, bond or other written evidence of debt
for the payment of money to order or bearer or transferrable by assignment shall
have the right to collect the whole amount of such promissory note, bond, or
other written evidence of debt for the payment of money, notwithstanding such
promissory note, bond or other written evidence of debt for the payment of money
may include a greater rate of interest or discount than eight per cent per annum;
provided such obligation shall not bear more than eight per cent per annum after
maturity until paid." LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2924 (1870).
120. See Vosbein v. Leopold, 230 La. 21, 87 So. 2d 715 (1956); cf. General
Securities Co. v. Jumonville, 216 La. 681, 44 So. 2d 702 (1950); Williams v.
Alphonse Mortgage Co., 144 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Jefferson
Securities Co. v. Benoit, 92 So. 2d 487 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). See also Mayfield v. Nunn, 239 La. 1021, 121 So. 2d 65 (1960) ; Note, 35 TUL. L. REV. 276
(1960).
121. 152 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied.
122. Time Finance Co. v. Louis, 152 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 244 La. 898, 154 So. 2d 768 (1963).
123. LA. 1.S. 6:571-593 (1950).
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licensee,1 24 and even if the creditor is a licensee, the permissible
interest cannot be increased by capitalizing it in a note. 125
Although the act could be construed to govern every transaction
in which interest is claimed on a sum of $300 or less, 12 1 it prob-

ably should not be so read. From its language1 27 and its purpose12 the Small Loans Act appears to embody the common law

concept of interest, which presupposes a loan or forbearance
of debt, and it has been expressly held that the act does not
apply to a credit sale. 129 That decision seems proper unless the
court is to adopt one of the theories recently evolved elsewhere
that credit sales are within the ambit of usury statutes embodying the common law concept of interest. 30 Article 2924 seems,
on the other hand, to encompass credit sales.' 3' If so, the Small
Loans Act should have no application to a vendee's plea of usury
in a credit sale even if the sum involved is less than $300.
The recent Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act l3

2

is another

statute which may determine whether a vendee's defense of
usury will prevail. This act provides for the licensing'33 and
regulation 134 of finance companies that purchase motor vehicle
installment sale contracts. Further it prescribes the form of
the contract between vendor and vendee' 3 5 and fixes maximum
finance charges. 13 6 The finance charge limitations are stated
124. See id. 6:583 for allowable interest a licensee may charge. Interest by
non-licensees cannot exceed 8% per annum. Id. 6:589.
125. See Home Finance Co. v. Padgett, 54 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
126. See LA. R.S. 6:572 (1950) : "No person shall engage in the business of
making loans of money, credit, goods, or things in action in the amount or to the
value of three hundred dollars or less, and charge, contract for, or receive a
greater rate of interest than eight percent per year, except as authorized by this
"
Chapter, and without first obtaining a license from the commissioner ...
Id. 6:589: "A. Except as authorized by this Chapter, no person shall directly
or indirectly charge, contract for, or receive any interest, discount, or consideration greater than eight percent per year upon the loan, use, or sale of credit, of
the amount or value of three hundred dollars or less.
127. See note 126 supra.
128. The object of the act is to regulate the business of making loans of $300
or less at greater interest than 8% per annum. See Davis Loan Co. v. Blanchard,
129 So. 413 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
129. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Swain, 176 So. 636 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1937).
130. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
131. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
132. LA. R.S. 6:951-964 (Supp. 1964). This act appears to have become effective January 1, 1963. See also the cognate statute, Direct Vehicle Loan Company Act, id. 6:970-976.
133. Id. 6:952.
134. Id. 6:953-955.
135. Id. 6:956. The section contains fairly significant disclosure provisions.
136. Id. 6:957: "A. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other existing
law, a retail installment transaction may include a finance charge not in excess
of the following rates:
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in terms of simple interest per month on the declining balance
and range from 15% per annum to over 27% per annum. It is
to be observed that the act classifies motor vehicles into the
same four categories employed by the act declared unconstitutional in Nebraska. 1 37 Since the Louisiana Constitution contains
the same prohibition of special laws fixing the rate of interest 38
as the Nebraska Constitution, the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act may be subject to serious constitutional objection. 13 9 If the
act is constitutional, 4 " a vendee presumably would be able to
recover the interest paid if the interest charged were in excess
of that permitted by the act. The act does not so provide; it
does provide that "Any seller or holder" who wilfully violates

the provisions relative to finance charges or contract form

"shall be barred from recovery of any finance charge, delinquency or collection charge on the contract. '1 '4 In such cases
the vendee should be allowed to recover any payment of finance
142
charge he has made because he has paid a debt not owed.
"Class 1. Any new motor vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a year
model not earlier than the year in which the sale is made, an amount equivalent
to one and one-fourth per cent (114%) per month simple interest on the declining balance.
"Class 2. Any new motor vehicle not in Class 1 and any used motor vehicle
designated by the manufacturer by a year model of the same or not more than
two years prior to the year in which the sale is made, an amount equivalent to
one and three-fourths per cent (1%%) per month simple interest on the declining balance.
"Class 3. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 and designated by the manufacturer by a year model not more than four years prior to the year in which
the sale is made, an amount equivalent to two and one-fourth per cent (2/4%)
per month simple interest on the declining balance.
"Class 4. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 or Class 3 and designated by
the manufacturer by a year model more than four years prior to the year in
which the sale is made, an amount equivalent to two and one-fourth per cent
(24%) per month simple interest on the declining balance, plus a flat charge
of one dollar per month for the number of months from the date of the contract
to the maturity date of the last installment thereunder, but in no event in excess
of twelve dollars."
137. Compare the statute quoted in note 136 supra with that quoted in note
62 supra.
138. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4: "The Legislature shall not pass any local or
special law on the following specified subjects: . . . Fixing the rate of interest.
." The Small Loans Act was upheld as not in violation of this section. State
v. Hill, 168 La. 761, 123 So. 317 (1929).
139. In Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963) the court had
to construe Nebraska's Installment Sales Act as fixing the rate of interest on
money. The Louisiana act by its very terms does so, thus inviting constitutional
objection.
140. Whether the act is a local or special law is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
141. LA. R.S. 6:960 (1950).
Criminal penalties for persons who "wilfully
and intentionally violate" any provision of the act are provided in id. 6:959.
142. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2133 (1870): "Every payment presupposes a
debt; what has been paid without having been due, is subject to be reclaimed.
That cannot be reclaimed that has been voluntarily given in discharge of a
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Further, to give full effect to the act, it should be interpreted
to supersede Civil Code article 2924 as to any promissory note
given in connection with a motor vehicle credit sale. So interpreted the act would protect the vendee against capitalized interest in excess of the legal maximum and would seem to make
143
usury a real defense available against a holder in due course.
The question of usury in retail credit sales in Louisiana
may be summarized as follows. Louisiana has adopted the general rule that usury statutes do not apply to credit sales. However, it is believed that "finance charge," the difference between cash sale price and credit sale price, is interest within
the contemplation of the Civil Code. If so, article 2924 limits
conventional interest to 8% per annum and this provision should
apply to credit sales. Vendee should be entitled to sue and recover the interest paid if it was usurious. 14 4 If the interest
has been capitalized in a promissory note, there is no usury
regardless of the amount of interest capitalized. Practically,
this may mean vendee is protected only if he has not given a
promissory note for the unpaid balance. The Motor Vehicle
Sales Finance Act may be interpreted to supersede article 2924
as to notes issued in motor vehicle purchases. This act may
allow munificent interest rates, but in general it seems to offer
greater protection to consumers than the illusory protection of
article 2924.
Karl W. Cavanaugh

EXPROPRIATION-COMPENSABLE
IN LOUISIANA

ITEMS

INTRODUCTION

The expansion of state-sponsored public improvement programs has increased the frequency with which the property
rights of individuals must yield to public interest.' An impingenatural obligation."
143. There is a conflict of authority whether usury is a real defense. Compare
In re Gerber's Estate, 337 Pa. 108, 9 A.2d 438 (1939) (no) with Employees
Loan Co. v. Templeton, 109 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (yes). Apparently
Louisiana has not passed on the question.
144. See LA. R.S. 9:3501 (1950).
1. State-sponsored public improvements are an inevitable result of an increasing population and a concentration of population in urban areas. An example is

